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 USING AND MISUSING HISTORY
 Suzanna Sherry
 Laura Kalman. The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism. New Haven: Yale
 University Press, 1996. viii + 375 pp. Notes and index. $40.00.
 Since Alfred Kelly coined the term "law-office history" in 1965, not much has
 been added-except ever-multiplying examples-to the perennial complaints
 about how lawyers and legal academics use history. Laura Kalman's engag-
 ing new book about legal scholarship is thus a welcome contribution to the
 field.
 Kalman begins by tracing the history of legal scholarship since the realists.
 The central conundrum the realists and their successors bequeathed to "legal
 liberals"-those who trust the courts to implement large-scale social reform-
 was how to keep their faith after the death of Earl Warren and subsequent
 attacks from both the Left and the Right. The first four chapters of the book
 are an accessible and enjoyable romp through legal realism, the legal process
 school, the "law and" movement, hermeneutics, and the various other
 scholarly fads that have entranced law professors over the years. Kalman
 provides nice insights into the relationships between law and other disci-
 plines and tries, although not always successfully, to relate the various
 movements to legal liberalism and its travails. She is occasionally too glib,
 especially when attributing malevolent motives to legal liberals: she claims,
 for example, that the crisis of legal liberalism in the 1980s might have been
 triggered partly by the fear of "male academic lawyers ... that the entrance of
 women and people of color into their ranks challenged their control of the law
 schools" (p. 94).
 This part of the book accomplishes several important goals. It provides an
 interesting and substantial history of modern legal scholarship. (I am perhaps
 not in the best position to assess this particular contribution, as it left me
 feeling a bit voyeuristic: I should disclose that my own work is mentioned
 quite prominently, to somewhat mixed reviews from Kalman.) Kalman is very
 good at this sort of history, and readers will come away with a deep
 understanding of the content and derivation of, and interrelationships be-
 tween, the most important modern legal theories.
 Even more important, however, is that Kalman's discussion of the ebb and
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 flow of legal liberalism provides a new and persuasive way to explain why
 lawyers do history the way they do (that is, according to most historians,
 badly). Kalman shows how legal liberalism-buffeted from both sides of the
 political spectrum and riven by internal division-was, by the mid-1980s,
 "dead, a historical relic" (p. 131). And so legal liberals turned to history for
 their salvation.
 What they found there was civic republicanism. Kalman does a wonderful
 job of explaining how civic republicanism satisfied all the needs of legal
 liberals. It enabled them to fend off attacks from originalists on the right by
 providing "alternative interpretations of the Founding" (p. 139). It comple-
 mented the growing interest in communitarianism that legal liberals were
 borrowing from political theorists. It promised to reduce the increasing
 polarization of the legal academy by allowing a synthesis between individual
 rights and community bonds, especially once republicanism was purged of its
 less desirable attributes such as sexism, authoritarianism, and racism. Kalman
 charmingly describes this purging as an attempt "to create a kinder, gentler
 republicanism" (p. 160). The synthesis between individuals and community
 in turn offered a way out of the countermajoritarian dilemma that had
 haunted legal liberals since the Warren Court. It is no wonder the
 neorepublicans "possessed a missionary spirit" (p. 155).
 But a religious mission is not the same as a historical one, and therein lies
 the key to the sometimes strained relationships between lawyers and histori-
 ans. As Kalman puts it, "historians ... favor context, change, and explana-
 tion," and lawyers "value text, continuity, and prescription" (p. 180). Histori-
 ans "delight in recreating the past in all its strangeness" (p. 186). For lawyers,
 however-especially neorepublicans on a mission-history is to be mined for
 its usefulness, not explored for its own sake. Legal liberals needed republican-
 ism as a tool in their war against conservative originalists, and could not
 afford the ambiguities, contradictions, and occasional distasteful results
 inherent in a truly historical approach to the Founders' thought. So, Kalman
 explains, "historians entered the fray to police their territory" (p. 163). This
 was not a difficult goal, for, as Kalman points out, "it is as easy to show that
 lawyers' legal history is ahistorical as it is to shoot fish in a barrel" (p. 179).
 Had Kalman's analysis stopped here, it would have contributed signifi-
 cantly to our understanding of legal liberalism. Perhaps her greatest insight,
 however, is her recognition that this is not the end of the story. She quotes
 Mark Tushnet that "it is not a lot of fun watching people shoot fish in barrels;
 indeed, one sometimes begins to develop sympathy both for the fish, who are
 doing the best they can in trying circumstances, and for their pursuers, who
 are doing the only thing they know how to do" (pp. 179-80). Kalman does in
 fact have great sympathy for both the lawyers and the historians, and seems
 to wish that each had a little more sympathy for the other.
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 She conveniently provides suggestions for developing that mutual sympa-
 thy. There is a difference, Kalman suggests, between "scholarly history and
 'public history' for nonacademic audiences" (including judges) (p. 202). The
 latter, while it should remain faithful to the goal of historical accuracy, may be
 less sophisticated, less ambiguous, and more forcefully stated. Historians
 should recognize that lawyers' legal history serves a different purpose than
 historians' legal history, and thus may not be as complex or nuanced.
 Lawyers, on the other hand, must nevertheless use history responsibly,
 becoming "more sensitive to the varieties of historical interpretation" (p. 206).
 She suggests a number of rules for responsible "public" scholarship, includ-
 ing that "the public historian's conclusion should not diverge from the
 scholar's" (p. 205). She offers as a cautionary example the case of women's
 historian Alice Kessler-Harris, whose own scholarship was used to rebut her
 testimony in a sex discrimination case.
 One might generalize Kalman's sound advice to both lawyers and histori-
 ans: never let your politics get in the way of your scholarship, whether public
 or academic. Indeed, the examples she gives of failures in both fields are often
 cases where a scholar was tripped up by an overwhelming desire to use (or
 abuse) scholarship to achieve a particular political result. Although not
 mentioned by Kalman, the current controversy over philosopher and classi-
 cist Martha Nussbaum's testimony in the suit challenging Colorado's anti-
 homosexual constitutional amendment is another case in point. Nussbaum
 testified that the Greeks did not disapprove of homosexuality, relying prima-
 rily on her translation of the Greek description of homosexuality as tolmema.
 While many experts give tolmema a negative connotation by translating it as
 "enormity" or "shameless act," she testified that it had the neutral or positive
 connation of "daring," and that "enormity" was a mistranslation. Her goal-
 to help invalidate a mean-spirited law later held unconstitutional by the
 United States Supreme Court-might have been laudable, but her means
 were questionable. She supported her testimony by referring to an outdated
 edition of the authoritative Greek dictionary. More recent editions include
 "enormity" among the definitions of tolmema. Although Nussbaum claimed
 to use the older edition exclusively, it turns out that she regularly cites a more
 recent edition in her own scholarly work. Even if Nussbaum's translation of
 tolmema is more accurate than that of the lexicon, she did herself no good by
 trying to finese the problematic entry.'
 In the end, though, it is not clear whether Kalman really wants lawyers and
 historians to take her advice, because doing so might doom legal liberalism.
 In a puzzling final chapter called "Trading Places," she suggests that just as
 historians are becoming more willing to accept history-as-ammunition, law-
 yers are becoming more critical of ahistorical attempts at recasting the
 Founders' intent. One might expect Kalman to applaud the lawyers' move
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 toward more responsible historical scholarship, but instead she seems to
 deplore it: she concludes the book by noting that "it would be unfortunate if
 law professors desert the barricades just as academics in other fields, such as
 historians, begin to show signs of appreciating what legal scholars are doing,
 and wanting to help" (p. 246).
 Perhaps she is merely troubled that lawyers have gone too far, and no
 longer recognize the need for "public" legal history scholarship. She does
 note that "history can never do as much as law professors want" (p. 235).
 Unfortunately, however, her criticism of the liberal retreat from ahistorical
 originalism is subject to misinterpretation. She seems to value liberal
 originalism primarily as a powerful tool against conservative originalism: in
 arguments over constitutional interpretation, she says, "Madison trumps
 everyone" (p. 238). It is tempting, therefore, to read her condemnation of legal
 liberals' move away from originalism as inviting a perusal of Madison's
 voluminous and sometimes contradictory writings in search of support for
 the liberal position.
 Would such an interpretation be misreading Kalman? To judge by the
 thoughtful analysis in most of the book, I believe that it would be. Kalman
 herself advocates a careful, responsible, and pragmatist approach, which sees
 a limited value in such arguments from history; she wouldnever countenance
 distortions of Madison's ideas even in the service of legal liberalism. But I am
 afraid she is expecting too much from most lawyers. She urges them to use
 what she recognizes as their most powerful weapon but to do so in modera-
 tion. Lawyers are, by training, disinclined to hold their fire; and liberal
 lawyers on a quasi-religious mission are doubly likely to read Kalman as
 urging them to (mis)use history for all it is worth.
 Despite this danger, however, Kalman's book will enlighten both lawyers
 and historians. She notes that lawyers and historians have always talked at
 cross-purposes. Once historians scorned lawyers' attempts to use, rather than
 merely to understand, history; now, Kalman suggests, "it is the historians
 who are trying to be pragmatic, the law professors who want to be academic"
 (p. 229). Thus, having slid past one another without managing to meet in the
 middle, they are still engaged in "their dialogue of the deaf" (p. 229). What
 might remedy this deafness and provoke a serious and productive dialogue
 between historians and lawyers? I would suggest that both groups read
 Kalman's book. It might help them understand one another-and themselves.
 Suzanna Sherry, Law School, University of Minnesota, is working on a book on
 postmodernism and law (forthcoming from Oxford University Press in 1997).
 1. For a balanced and readable account of the whole controversy, see Daniel Mendelsohn,
 "The Stand: Expert Witnesses and Ancient Mysteries in a Colorado Courtroom," Lingua
 Franca (September/October 1996), at p. 35.
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